President's message: Banking on credibility by Jeff Lacker
T
his issue of Region Focus
comes at a time when
inflation is on many 
people’s minds. The prices of
some commodities have been
shattering records, putting pres-
sure on companies that use 
those products to increase what
they charge their customers.
Consumer prices, excluding food
and energy, rose at an annual rate
of 3.1 percent in the first five
months of 2006, compared with
2.2 percent for all of the previous year. During such periods,
attention turns to the Fed to see what policy steps it will take.
And with the spotlight so intense, the Fed understands that
maintaining its credibility is of the utmost importance. 
A central bank’s monetary policy is considered credible if
the public perceives that it is committed to keeping inflation
low and stable. Without credibility, it would be difficult for
the central bank to anchor the public’s expectations of 
future inflation, which complicates monetary policymaking.
A central bank ultimately would like its policy to affect the
real interest rate through changes in the nominal target rate,
the difference between the two being expectations of future
inflation. But if inflation expectations are volatile, it will be
harder to pin down what the policy rate should be. 
Inflation expectations tend to be self-fulfilling in the
sense that the anticipation of much higher prices in the
future puts upward pressure on current prices. If a central
bank’s record in fighting off higher prices is weak, shocks
that hit the economy can easily unhinge inflation expecta-
tions and push the inflation rate upward. By contrast, if a
central bank’s credibility is well-established, people are less
jittery about every piece of news that can affect future 
inflation, making it easier for the central bank to pursue
price stability. 
The notion that credibility is critical to monetary policy
follows from the recognition that people are rational when
forming their expectations. They understand a central bank’s
preferences for low, stable inflation and will use this knowl-
edge to predict future monetary policy moves. Because the
Fed failed to adequately take forward-looking expectations
into account during the “go-stop” monetary policy of the
1960s and 1970s, its attempts to exploit the perceived trade-
off between output and employment were futile.
Each time the Fed stimulated the economy in the 
go phase of the policy cycle, it would wait too long before
tightening policy in the stop phase. By this time, higher 
inflation expectations had already crept into the public’s 
pricing decisions. After several go-stop cycles, inflation rose
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to its highest level in three decades. Attempts by the Fed to
“fine-tune” the economy had failed. 
This inflationary phase ended when the Fed, under the
guidance of Paul Volcker, tightened policy until inflation was
brought under control and inflationary expectations were
anchored at low levels. In October 1979, Volcker introduced 
a dramatic policy shift that eventually resulted in the fed 
funds rate rising to nearly 20 percent. This aggressive tight-
ening came at the cost of a sharp recession in early 1980 
and another that began in mid-1981 and lasted until well 
into 1982. But the Fed understood that its credibility was at
stake. In order to return the economy to more stable times,
the Fed needed to send a strong and unwavering signal of 
its commitment to fight inflation.
In the ensuing years, the Volcker Fed remained watchful in
preserving its hard-won credibility, recognizing that it can
easily be lost. Former Richmond Fed economist Marvin
Goodfriend has observed that although inflation was only
about 4 percent in 1983 to 1984, the long bond rate, an 
indicator of inflation expectations, was trading significantly
higher. Knowing that it should not take such signals for
granted, the Fed pre-empted this threat by raising the 
fed funds rate to about 11 percent. Since that time, there 
have been several “inflation scares” in which rising bond
yields warned of potentially higher inflation. But each time,
under Volcker and his successor Alan Greenspan, the Fed
responded to pre-empt the threat. 
The success of the Volcker and Greenspan Feds at keeping
inflation expectations in check paved the way for the “Great
Moderation,” a long and sustained period of output and 
inflation stability. As a result, it is widely acknowledged 
that maintaining price stability is the best contribution a 
central bank can make to ensuring sustained growth in
incomes and employment. But even after 25 years of relatively
sound policy, the Fed understands that in a low inflation 
environment, as much as in a high one, it must remain vigilant. 
Signs of rising inflation have surfaced this year. How serious
those signs are remains unclear — productivity growth is
strong and the cost of labor relative to output has barely moved
since a year ago. Even so, preserving its credibility requires
reacting appropriately to keep inflation low and stable. The Fed
has spent much effort establishing a reputation for making
price stability its primary objective. That has been a long and
hard-fought battle, one that we must continue to wage. 
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